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CIVIL RIGHTS
What Is the Time Limit for Filing a Lawsuit?
It Depends on What Your Definition
of "Arising Under" Is!
by Barbara J. Fick
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 263-266. © 2004 American Bar Association.
42 U.S.C. § 1981, originally enacted
by Congress in 1866, gives all per-
Isons the same right "to make and
enforce contracts" as is enjoyed by
white citizens, thus providing a
cause of action for race discrimina-
tion in the making of, among other
things, employment contracts. As
with many federal statutes, § 1981
did not contain its own statute of
limitations for filing a lawsuit. The
Supreme Court has held that when
federal law does not supply a statute
of limitations, the courts should
apply the most closely analogous
state-law statute of limitations so
long as it is not inconsistent with
federal law. In the case of § 1981,
the Supreme Court determined that
courts should apply the forum
state's limitations period for person-
al injury suits. Goodman v. Lukens
Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
The scope of the rights protected
under § 1981 was unclear: did the
phrase "make and enforce con-
tracts" include only discrimination
in the initial act of contract forma-
tion (i.e., hiring), or was it broad
enough to include discrimination in
terms and conditions of employ-
ment as well as firing? In Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989), the Court held that
§ 1981 prohibits discrimination only
as to the initial decision to enter
into the contract (i.e., hiring) and
does not apply to any conduct
occurring thereafter.
In response, Congress amended
§ 1981 by passing the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, adding to 42 U.S.C. §
1981 a subsection (b) that specifi-
cally defines the term "to make and
enforce contracts" to include not
only the initial contract formation
but also "termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms and conditions of
the contractual relationship."
Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
In the interim between the
Patterson decision and the amend-
ment to § 1981, Congress enacted
(Continued on Page 264)
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28 U.S.C. § 1658, a catch-all uni-
form statute of limitations of four
years that governs actions arising
under federal laws enacted after
December 1, 1990, (the date of the
enactment of § 1658) whenever the
federal law does not contain its own
limitations period. The purpose
behind § 1658 was to supplant the
uncertainty and variations created
by the previous rule under which
courts attempted to identify the
most closely analogous state statute
of limitations to apply in the
absence of a federal rule.
ISSUE
In deciding the statute of limitations
for lawsuits filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 alleging race discrimination
with respect to firing and terms and
conditions of employment, should
courts apply the forum state's per-
sonal injury limitations period or
the four-year catch-all period con-
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 1658?
FACTS
R.R. Donnelley & Sons is a commer-
cial printing company that operated
a manufacturing plant in Chicago.
The Chicago plant was closed in
July 1994. On November 25, 1996,
a class action lawsuit was filed in
federal district court for the north-
ern district of Illinois under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 alleging that R.R.
Donnelley had discriminated against
its African American employees by
1) discharging African American
employees when the plant closed
but giving white employees the
opportunity to transfer; 2) regularly
assigning African American employ-
ees to nonpermanent jobs at the
Chicago plant whereas white
employees were assigned to perma-
nent jobs; and 3) subjecting African
American employees to a racially
discriminatory work environment.
Donnelley filed a motion for partial
summary judgment seeking dis-
missal of all claims that arose prior
to November 26, 1994, asserting
that those claims fell outside the
Illinois two-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury lawsuits, a
limitations period that was to be
applied pursuant to Goodman. The
district court denied Donnelley's
motion as to the first and third cate-
gory of claims, holding that these
claims were governed by the statute
of limitations established in 28
U.S.C. § 1658. (The court left open
the limitations question as to the
second category of claims.) The
court determined that claims relat-
ing to discharge and terms and
conditions of employment (i.e.,
harassment) were cognizable only
after Congress amended § 1981 in
1991; therefore these claims arose
under a federal law enacted after
December 1, 1990, and thus were
governed by § 1658. Jones v. R.R
Donnelley & Sons, 149 F. Supp.2d
459 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
The district court granted
Donnelley's motion to certify to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
the question whether the termina-
tion and harassment claims were
governed by § 1658 or by the
Illinois personal-injury statute of
limitations. The Seventh Circuit
accepted Donnelley's appeal. The
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the
district court's interpretation of
§ 1658. It held that the phrase used
in § 1658, "an Act of Congress
enacted after" December 1, 1990, is
not the same as "an Act of Congress
enacted or amended" after that
date. When Congress amends an
existing statute it does not create a
new act. Section 1658 applies only
when Congress creates a wholly new
cause of action. When Congress
amended § 1981 by supplying a
broader definition for the term "to
make and enforce contracts" it was
not creating a new statutory provi-
sion but merely more precisely
defining an existing right. Therefore
§ 1658 does not apply to plaintiffs'
§ 1981 claims; rather their cause of
action is governed by Illinois' two-
year personal injury limitations
period as per Goodman. Jones v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 305 F.3d
717 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which the
Court granted. 123 S.Ct. 2074, 155
L.Ed.2d 1059 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The arguments in this case are
focused on interpreting the phrase,
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1658, "a
civil action arising under an Act of
Congress enacted after" December
1, 1990.
Petitioners assert that the 1991 con-
gressional amendment of § 1981
expanded the scope of the statute
and created substantive rights that
had not existed before the amend-
ment. The Supreme Court in
Patterson quite clearly held that
claims of race discrimination relat-
ing to discharge and racial harass-
ment were not cognizable under the
original § 1981.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that Congress's 1991
amendment of § 1981 created an
entirely new cause of action. In
Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511
U.S. 298 (1994), the Court held that
the obligations imposed by the 1991
amendment should not be applied
retroactively because they created
causes of action that "had no legal
existence before th[at] Act passed."
The amendment was not solely defi-
nitional but created new legal oblig-
ations, expanding the scope of the
original protections contained in
§ 1981.
The term "enact" means "to make
into law"; thus every statute passed
by Congress, whether it deals with
an entirely new subject or amends
an existing law, is an enactment.
Issue No. 5264
Petitioners' claims constitute a civil
action arising under an act of
Congress enacted after December 1,
1990 and the four-year statute of
limitations from 28 U.S.C. § 1658
applies.
The United States, in an amicus
brief supporting petitioners, notes
that the term "arising under" has a
settled legal meaning. The Supreme
Court has held that a claim "arises
under" federal law if either federal
law creates the cause of action or
the plaintiffs right to relief depends
on resolution of a substantial ques-
tion of federal law. Holmes Group,
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
Petitioners' claims in this case clear-
ly arise under the 1991 amendment
because that was the federal law
that created their cause of action.
As the Supreme Court in Patterson
made clear, petitioners had no cause
of action for racial harassment or
discriminatory discharge under the
original § 1981.
The key question for deciding if
§ 1658 applies is not the method
Congress used to create the new
cause of action (i.e., the process)
but rather whether Congress has
created a new cause of action (i.e.,
the substance). Congress may cre-
ate a cause of action by enacting a
free-standing statute or by enacting
an amendment to an existing
statute. The substance of a con-
gressional enactment may change
the burden of proof governing an
existing claim or may create an
entirely new claim. In the former
case, a plaintiffs chances for suc-
cess may improve or decrease but
the existence of the plaintiffs' claim
has not been affected. The 1991
amendment was an act of Congress
that created a new cause of action.
When Congress enacted § 1658 it
determined that it would apply
prospectively only so as not to dis-
rupt the settled expectations of liti-
gants with respect to previously
enacted legislation. While parties
had expectations with respect to the
limitations period for claims of dis-
crimination in hiring under the orig-
inal § 1981, there was no such
expectation as to claims relating to
discharge or terms and conditions of
employment, since such claims did
not exist. Therefore, application of
§ 1658 to the 1991 amendment of
§ 1981 will not disrupt settled
expectations.
Moreover § 1658 does not require
that a claim must exclusively arise
under an act enacted after
December 1, 1990, only that it arise
under such an act. That petitioners'
claims depend in part on the origi-
nal § 1981, as well as the amended
section, does not undermine the
fact that their claims arise under
the 1991 amendment.
Applying § 1658 to some claims that
arise under § 1981 (those based on
the 1991 amendment) and applying
the forum state personal-injury limi-
tation period to other claims arising
under the original § 1981 will not be
unworkable. Courts routinely apply
different statutes of limitations to
different claims within the same
lawsuit.
Respondent counters that the term
"arising under" is ambiguous and
should be interpreted based on the
statutory context and purpose.
Congress intended to preserve the
limitations period for existing statu-
tory regimes and to create the
catch-all limitation rule only for
newly created statutory regimes;
that is why Congress expressly stat-
ed that § 1658 should be applied
prospectively only. There was a
clearly existing statute of limitations
rule for the § 1981 statutory regime,
established by the Supreme Court
in Goodman, which predates the
passage of § 1658.
A civil action arises from the statute
that codifies the elements of a
claim. In this case, petitioners'
claim is that there was racial dis-
crimination in the making of a con-
tract, a claim that is codified in the
original § 1981. The 1991 amend-
ment (§ 1981(b)) is a definitional
subsection of the original text that
states that the term "to make" a
contract includes the termination of
the contract and the terms and
conditions of the contract. Thus
petitioners are suing for racial dis-
crimination in the making of a con-
tract (a cause of action arising
under the original § 1981), which is
defined by the 1991 amendment to
include claims of discharge and
racial harassment. A cause of action
does not arise under a statute's defi-
nitions, but rather under its sub-
stantive terms, which in this case is
the original § 1981.
The respondent further contends
that petitioners' interpretation of
§ 1658 will create uncertainty and
increased litigation. It is often diffi-
cult to determine whether an
amendment modifies an existing
right or creates a new one. Every
time Congress amends a federal
statute, there will be litigation
about whether § 1658 applies.
Indeed, in this case the district
court refused to decide whether
§ 1658 applied to the second catego-
ry of claims (discriminatory assign-
ment) because further facts needed
to be developed in order to deter-
mine whether those claims were
actionable under Patterson before
the 1991 amendment.
Civil actions that arise under statu-
tory regimes that pre-date § 1658
(such as § 1981) have established
limitations periods that Congress
intended to preserve. A claim "aris-
es under" a statute enacted after
December 1, 1990, only if the
statute creates a wholly new claim
(Continued on Page 266)
American Bar Association 265
that does not have an existing
statute of limitations. Petitioners'
claims in this ease arise under
§ 1981 and are governed by the
existing statute of limitations rule as
established in Goodman.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Court's decision on this issue
could determine the outcome of the
entire case. The overwhelming
majority of petitioners' claims will
be time barred if the Court applies
the two-year Illinois personal injury
limitations period as per Goodman.
On the other hand, if the Court
applies the § 1658 four-year limita-
tions period, respondent will be
facing claims from more than 500
former employees in this class
action.
On a broader scale, the Court's
interpretation of § 1658 will provide
guidance to the lower courts in
determining when to apply this fed-
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